How you can build an eavesdropper for a quantum cryptosystem Qin Liu. Yovisto Academic Video Search. hardware demo during the lecture This presentation will show the first experimental implementation of an eavesdropper for quantum cryptosystem. Although quantum cryptography has been proven unconditionally secure, by exploiting physical imperfections (detector vulnerability) we have successfully built an intercept-resend attack and demonstrated eavesdropping under realistic conditions on an installed quantum key distribution line. The actual eavesdropping hardware we have built will be shown during the conference. Quantum cryptography, as being based on the laws of physics, was claimed to be much more secure than all classical cryptography schemes.(Un)fortunately physical hardware is not beyond of an evil control: We present a successful attack of an existing quantum key distribution system exploiting a photon detector vulnerability which is probably present in all existing devices. Without Alice and Bob losing their faith in their secure communication, we recorded 100% of the supposedly secret key. Single photon detectors based on passively quenched avalanche photodiodes are used in a number of quantum key distribution experiments. A vulnerability has been found in which these detectors can be temporarily blinded and then forced to produce a click [1]. An attack exploiting this vulnerability against a free-space polarization based quantum cryptosystem [2,3] is feasible. By controlling the polarization of a bright beam the eavesdropper Eve can force any detector of her choice to fire in the legitimate receiver Bob, such that she gets a full control of it without introducing additional errors. This allows Eve to run an intercept-resend attack without getting caught, and obtain a full copy of the transmitted secret key. We have fully demonstrated this attack under realistic conditions on an installed fiber optic quantum key distribution system. The system uses polarization encoding over 290 m of optical fiber spanning four buildings. A complete eavesdropper has been built, inserted at a mid-way point in the fiber line, and 100% of the secret key information has been recorded. Under attack, no significant changes in the system operating parameters have been observed by the legitimate users, which have happily continued to generate their 'secret' key. [1] V. Makarov, New J. Phys. 11, 065003 (2009). [2] I. Marcikic, A. Lamas-Linares, C. Kurtsiefer, Appl. Phys. Lett. 89, 101122 (2006). [3] M. P. Peloso et al., New J. Phys. 11, 045007 (2009). CCC This presentation will show the first experimental implementation of an eavesdropper for quantum cryptosystem. Although quantum cryptography has been proven unconditionally secure, by exploiting physical imperfections (detector vulnerability) we have successfully built an intercept-resend attack and demonstrated eavesdropping under realistic conditions on an installed quantum key distribution line. The actual eavesdropping hardware we have built will be shown during the conference. Quantum cryptography, as being based on the laws of physics, was claimed to be much more secure than all classical cryptography schemes.(Un)fortunately physical hardware is not beyond of an evil control: We present a successful attack of an existing quantum key distribution system exploiting a photon detector vulnerability which is probably present in all existing devices. Without Alice and Bob losing their faith in their secure communication, we recorded 100% of the supposedly secret key. Single photon detectors based on passively quenched avalanche photodiodes are used in a number of quantum key distribution experiments. A vulnerability has been found in which these detectors can be temporarily blinded and then forced to produce a click [1]. An attack exploiting this vulnerability against a free-space polarization based quantum cryptosystem [2,3] is feasible. By controlling the polarization of a bright beam the eavesdropper Eve can force any detector of her choice to fire in the legitimate receiver Bob, such that she gets a full control of it without introducing additional errors. This allows Eve to run an intercept-resend attack without getting caught, and obtain a full copy of the transmitted secret key. We have fully demonstrated this attack under realistic conditions on an installed fiber optic quantum key distribution system. The system uses polarization encoding over 290 m of optical fiber spanning four buildings. A complete eavesdropper has been built, inserted at a mid-way point in the fiber line, and 100% of the secret key information has been recorded. Under attack, no significant changes in the system operating parameters have been observed by the legitimate users, which have happily continued to generate their 'secret' key. [1] V. Makarov, New J. Phys. 11, 065003 (2009). [2] I. Marcikic, A. Lamas-Linares, C. Kurtsiefer, Appl. Phys. Lett. 89, 101122 (2006). [3] M. P. Peloso et al., New J. Phys. 11, 045007 (2009). QQA title subtitle pie ill HIT JUICE EVC QKD makes random choices value measurement bas Bob choice basis Alice bits far which they have used same bit cases Eve make wrong guess detected SPAD question breakdown BELOW linear mode ABOVE basin amplifier Gain trigger device sired JIG irfi OFF PBSS 2aa With illumination SPAD kpt below now works mere PAD blind single threshold click classical pulse above comparator Now blind now click Brim Illumination lumps det actor blinds Single Sokw attack Eve forces detection result onto Bob sending background light keep blinded paler above threshold mak urget detectar click smear basis split half below JQA XII nov AHCO EPR source entangled photons Bob FP9 FPC QKD under attack EVE final schem Eavesdropping installed QKD line Does Eve really have key Clicks Sob OXO iii Raw key rate counts over minutes Eve sent Bob bits received Correlated Extra clicks kept correct bit value limit setting alarm noticeable change after interruption implementation attack under realistic conditions Atl tii Ill anne mjl Counts detector channel second hilt Counts detector channel second xii Iii Illustration with que irk xga ail Dii ill QKD practically secure because you can only build certain YES built right some with unknown potential problems brink laws This work released mon org recording supported FED Forschungsgemeinschaft elektronische Medien www farn wwu rcr TIRE FIG UCU

How you can build an eavesdropper for a quantum cryptosystem

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Title:
How you can build an eavesdropper for a quantum cryptosystem
Subtitle:
hardware demo during the lecture
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Date/Place:
2009-12-27 Berlin
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640x480 (flv-player)
Category:
Computer Science
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other
Language:
en
Duration:
00:52:01
Keywords:
Hacking Quantum cryptography
Description:
This presentation will show the first experimental implementation of an eavesdropper for quantum cryptosystem. Although quantum cryptography has been proven unconditionally secure, by exploiting physical imperfections (detector vulnerability) we have successfully built an intercept-resend attack and demonstrated eavesdropping under realistic conditions on an installed quantum key distribution line. The actual eavesdropping hardware we have built will be shown during the conference. Quantum cryptography, as being based on the laws of physics, was claimed to be much more secure than all classical cryptography schemes.(Un)fortunately physical hardware is not beyond of an evil control: We present a successful attack of an existing quantum key distribution system exploiting a photon detector vulnerability which is probably present in all existing devices. Without Alice and Bob losing their faith in their secure communication, we recorded 100% of the supposedly secret key. Single photon detectors based on passively quenched avalanche photodiodes are used in a number of quantum key distribution experiments. A vulnerability has been found in which these detectors can be temporarily blinded and then forced to produce a click [1]. An attack exploiting this vulnerability against a free-space polarization based quantum cryptosystem [2,3] is feasible. By controlling the polarization of a bright beam the eavesdropper Eve can force any detector of her choice to fire in the legitimate receiver Bob, such that she gets a full control of it without introducing additional errors. This allows Eve to run an intercept-resend attack without getting caught, and obtain a full copy of the transmitted secret key. We have fully demonstrated this attack under realistic conditions on an installed fiber optic quantum key distribution system. The system uses polarization encoding over 290 m of optical fiber spanning four buildings. A complete eavesdropper has been built, inserted at a mid-way point in the fiber line, and 100% of the secret key information has been recorded. Under attack, no significant changes in the system operating parameters have been observed by the legitimate users, which have happily continued to generate their 'secret' key. [1] V. Makarov, New J. Phys. 11, 065003 (2009). [2] I. Marcikic, A. Lamas-Linares, C. Kurtsiefer, Appl. Phys. Lett. 89, 101122 (2006). [3] M. P. Peloso et al., New J. Phys. 11, 045007 (2009).
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